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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

FRANK L. STEWART,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

Case No.
8491

ARNOLD LESIN,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is a licensed real estate broker doing business at Fillmore, Utah. Defendant was a dealer in new
and used Chrysler and Plymouth cars, operating an
agency, sales office and repair shop in a building at
Fillmore, Utah, and desired to sell the building and busi-

ness.
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On April 22, 1952 a listing agreement designated
as a "Sales Contract" ( R.3) was executed, authorizing
plaintiff to sell the building and ground, tools and inven~
tory for "approximately $88,000.00." The agreement
provided that the defendant would pay to plaintiff "5%
of the above sale price or such other sale price as I may
agree to accept, immediately a sale or exchange is effected, .... "
Plaintiff then endeavored to find a purchaser, contacted prospects and advertised the property. As a result, he came in contact with Mr. Lorin Peck of Salt
Lake City, Utah, who expressed an interest in the property and business. Mr. Peck was taken to Fillmore, where
he examined the property and toured the community.
He there discussed the business generally with both plaintiff and defendant and went over the equipment, parts,
books and records with the defendant, Mr. Lesin. (R.
19). Several trips were made and the properties inspected, and finally the general terms of the sale were settled
by the agreed exchange of certain properties. On or
about September 18, 1952 the defendant came to Salt
Lake City with the plaintiff and they met with the prospective purchaser at his home.
After discussions, the defendant, as seller, and Mr.
Peck, as buyer, asked the plaintiff to type up a contract
for the sale or trade of the properties. ( R. 21 and 22).
This document was then prepared in their presence and
signed by all three there on September 18, 195 2 as the
"Contract of Sale or Trade." ( R. 4) . The buyer then
paid to the defendant, as seller, the sum of $2,000.00.
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As provided by the Contract, the parties met together the next day to "complete the transfer of the above
listed property." Attorneys representing buyer and seller
were requested to check abstracts and to prepare the
necessary documents to complete the deal. Mr. Peck,
at this point, insisted that the defendant guaranty to
him the Chrysler-Plymouth agency. No guaranty was or
could be made thereon as the buyer had been previously
advised by both plaintiff and defendant. ( R. 36, 38,
and Page 22 of Lesin deposition).
The buyer and seller never completed the transaction and the buyer demanded back his $2000.00
which was refused by defendant. The buyer, Lorin
Peck, then sued the defendant, Arnold Lesin, for recovery of the $2000.00 in case #97736 in the District Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah. The complaint (R.
85) was answered by defendant ( R. 94), wherein defendant claimed that the agreement of September 18, 1952
(supra) was binding and that the defendant was ready,
willing and able to perform and he demanded damages
in the amount of $3874.40. Trial was had and completed
and the Court on February 5, 1954 found that the contract executed September 18, 1952 (supra) was partly
in writing and partly oral and that defendant had breached his oral promise to obtain a franchise for the sale of
Chryslers and Plymouths, (R. 110, 111), and judgment
was entered for return of the $2000.00 deposit. (R. 112).
Plaintiff is here suing for his commission on the
transaction on the basis that he has fully performed his
obligations as a broker when he brought together a will-
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ing seller and a willing buyer and the parties contracted
for the sale and exchange of properties on September 18,
1952.
The defendant did not personally appear at the
trial to testify but was represented by counsel. His only
testimony in the record is a part of the deposition which
he gave in the prior trial between Mr. Peck and the
defendant.
The buyer and seller agreed to the valuation of the
properties that were to be exchanged at $88,000.00. (R.
81).
At the conclusion of the present case, the trial court
announced his conclusion and judgment "that there was
no sale and that the defendant may have judgment for
no cause of action.'' (R. 75). Thereafter, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions and Judgment adverse to plaintiff's
claim to a commission for his services as broker in the
transaction. ( R. 78-80) .
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SELL THE PROPERTY UPON TERMS ACCEPTED BY THE DEFENDANT.
POINT II
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO OBTAIN A PURCHASER FOR THE PROPERTY WHO WAS READY, ABLE AND WILLING TO PURCHASE
SAID PROPERTY UPON THE TERMS SET FORTH IN THE LISTING CONTRACT OR UPON ANY OTHER TERMS ACCEPTABLE
TO THE DEFENDANT.
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POINT III
THAT THE QUESTION OF A COMPLETE AGREEMENT FOR
EXCHANGE OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND
THE PROSPECTIVE BUYER WAS RES JUDICATA.
POINT IV
THAT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT FOR THE
SUM OF $4,400.00, BEING 5% OF THE AGREED VALUE OF
$88,000.00 FOR THE PROPERTIES THAT WERE TO BE EXCHANGED.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SELL THE PROPERTY UPON TERMS ACCEPTED BY THE DEFENDANT.
POINT II
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO OBTAIN A PURCHASER FOR THE PROPERTY WHO WAS READY, ABLE AND WILLING TO PURCHASE
SAID PROPERTY UPON THE TERMS SET FORTH IN THE LISTING CONTRACT OR UPON ANY OTHER TERMS ACCEPTABLE
TO THE DEFENDANT.

It is the position of the plaintiff that his duties and
responsibilities ceased when he had brought together a
buyer and seller and they had executed their written
Contract of Sale or Trade ( R. 4) and the buyer paid to
the seller $2000.00 to bind the transaction.
The measure of what he must do as a broker to
earn his commission is found in the written "Sales Contract" (R. 3) wherein it is recited that a 5% commission shall be paid on the "above sale price or such
other sale price as I may agree to accept, immediately a
sale or exchange is effected .... " The buyer and seller
agreed to exchange properties based upon an agreed
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sum of $88,000.00 and agreed to meet the next day and
transfer the listed properties.
Is the broker to be denied his commission because
the seller fails to perform the contract he has made with
the prospective buyer? Such is the effect of the decision
in this case. The defendant has had two turns in court
on the same basic question. When the buyer sued to get
his down payment back, the court found that such must
be returned because the defendant failed to perform the
acts upon which the contract of sale was conditioned. (R.
111 ) Now the defendant has switched positions and to
get out of paying a commission, he denies that he agreed
to sell the properties to the said buyer.
The matter is akin to the situation where a real
estate broker brings together a prospective buyer and
seller and an earnest money receipt is executed. Then
the seller either changes his mind or the title to his property is defective so no sale is completed. The broker has
already earned his commission notwithstanding his client's
failure to complete the deal and deliver a good marketable title.
Cases dealing with the matter have been decided by
this court generally in favor of the broker. We submit
that the following decisions are in point:
Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., 1 Utah (2d) 9, 261
Pac. (2d) 927. The issues revolved around the real
estate broker's right to the stated 5% commission on the
sale of lots. $1000.00 was paid on the execution of the
earnest money receipt and agreement. That offer of
purchase was accepted by the owner and the down pay-
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ment was held by the broker. Thereafter negotiations on
the sale continued until the parties abandoned the deal.
The trial court denied recovery to the broker but the
Supreme Court reversed it, and ordered entry of judgment in favor of the broker for the full 5% commission.
In part, the decision of this Court said :
"That agreement certainly contemplated that
the plaintiff would cooperate in good faith toward
the accomplishments of the purpose for which he
employed defendant. He cannot be permitted to
procure them to obtain a buyer, on terms accepted
by the plaintiff, and then prevent the accomplishment of what he requested and authorized them
to do by arbitrarily refusing to perform his part
of the transaction. Under such circumstances, he
will not be heard to complain of their failure to
do that which he prevented."
Soon after the Hoyt decision, this Court handed
down Curtis v. Mortensen, 1 Utah 354, 267 Pac. (2d)
237 (March 1954). The customary listing agreement
was executed by defendants in favor of the plaintiff as
a real estate broker to authorize sale of a motel and payment of a 5% commission for such services. A purchaser
was found and an earnest money receipt and agreement
signed. $5000.00 was on deposit with the broker to bind
the transaction. The owners consulted their attorney
and upon finding that the acceptance by purchasers of
the offer of sale was still conditional, rescinded the contract. Purchasers then came to Utah and unsuccessfully
endeavored to enforce specific performance by legal proceedings. In this action for the real estate broker's com-
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miSSion, once again the District Court denied recovery
but the Supreme Court reversed such decision. The
opinion provided in part:
"The proposed purchasers were a~ious. t? buy
the property even after respondents rescission of
the earnest money agreement. Their suit for specific performance is ample proof of that fact. There
can be no question about their willingness to buy
and it was stipulated that they had the financial
ability to consummate the sale. The sale was never
consummated because respondents changed their
minds and refused to sell and not because the
buyers refused to make a binding agreement. Under such circumstances appellants have fulfilled
their part of the listing agreement by having produced purchasers who were ready, willing and
able to buy the listed property and are entitled
to their commission. Such were the terms of the
listing agreement made by the parties. There was
no requirement that a binding contract be entered
into and for us to add that requirement would be
to make a new contract for them. This we may
not do. As stated in 8 Am. Jur. Sec. 184, page
1097:
"'Once the broker has procured a person
who is able, ready and willing to purchase on the
terms offered by the owner, he is entitled to commissions, even though the failure to complete the
contract is due to the default or refusal of the employer.'
"This court in Little and Little v. Fleishman,
35 Utah 566, on page 568, 101 P. 984, on page
984, 24 L.R.A., N.S., 1182 indicated it was in
accord with the above state~ent, even though it
was unnecessary to a decision of that case since
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a binding offer had been obtained by the owner,
by saying:
"'***The substantial features of the agreement between plaintiffs and the defendant are
that the plaintiffs were employed to effect, not
consummate, a sale, and were entitled to a commission in the event of a sale at any price agreed
upon. When the plaintiff obtained and produced
a purchaser who was able, ready, and willing to
purchase for the price, and on the terms proposed
they did all that was required of them, and the
owner could not, under the terms of his contract
with them, arbitrarily refuse to sell and decline to
enter into negotiations of a sale with the proposed
purchaser without becoming liable to plaintiffs
for their commission.***'"
The defendant absented himself from the trial, apparently realizing that to do otherwise he must contradict the testimony given at the earlier trial between him
and the buyer. The defense semed to be based upon some
theory that the plaintiff here, Mr. Stewart, as broker,
had interposed the condition that the Chrysler-Plymouth
agency was a part of the deal. However, our plaintiff
specifically testified that the prospective buyer had been
taken to Fillmore and advised by him and the defendant
that the agency could not be sold ( R. 36 & 38). The same
testimony is found in the defendant's testimony at page
22 of hi,s deposition.
Thus the defendant has taken two diametrically opposed positions to best further his plan; first to keep the
down payment on the theory that a complete contract
had been made with the buyer and now, that no contract
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has been made so he will not have to pay the commisSlOn.

'

A broker has no obligation to guarantee the ultimate
good faith and performance of the parties to the buy
and sell agreement. Here the buyer and seller dealt with
each other at arms length. Each was an experienced
business man. Inspections of properties were made and
they bargained back and forth. Then these mature men
made a deal. So no delay would intervene, they insisted
that the plaintiff, as broker, sit down at the buyer's home
in their presence and type up the items so agreed upon.
To bind the sale and exchange, they then read and signed
the agreement and $2000.00 was paid to the defendant.
Prior negotiations, questions and representations of
the parties were merged into their "Contract of Sale or
Trade" on September 18, 1952. The broker's duties had
been performed and his commission earned. At this
stage the broker had brought together two experienced
businessmen and had produced for his client a buyer
who was ready, able and willing to complete the transaction. Mr. Peck, the prospective buyer, testified that as
of the date of the agreement, he was worth $100,000.00.
(R. 64).
POINT III
THAT THE QUESTION OF A COMPLETE AGREEMENT FOR
EXCHANGE OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND
THE PROSPECTIVE BUYER WAS RES JUDICATA. .

The basic principle of the rule of res judicata is
that matters once at issued be set at rest and further that
parties be not permitted to vascillate between positions
after a judicial determination.
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The prior case here involved is Civil No. 97736 between Lorin Peck, the buyer and Arnold Lesin, the seller.
The issue was whether or not the $2000.00 earnest
money should be returned. This revolved around the
question of whether the plaintiff or the defendant breached the contract of sale or trade. The same basic contract
dated September 18, 1952 as signed by the parties was
in evidence and at issue.
The District Court in and for Salt Lake County
through Judge Joseph G. Jeppson tried the case without
a jury and made the Findings and Judgment (Tr. 110,
111, 112). These findings included these determinations
among others:
"1. On September 18, 1952, plaintiff and
defendant entered into an agreement, partly oral
and partly in writing, providing that plaintiff
would trade to defendant certain property together with $15,000.00 in cash for a certain business of the defendant known as the Lesin Motor
Company.
"2. Said promise of plaintiff to pay said
$15,000.00 and transfer said property to the defendant was conditioned upon the defendant's obtaining for the plaintiff the franchise for the sale
of new Chrysler and Plymouth automobiles at
Fillmore, Utah, and this condition was known to
and understood by both plaintiff and defendant.
"6. Plaintiff fully complied with all the
terms of said conditional contract, but defendant
failed, as aforesaid, to perform the acts upon
which said contract was conditioned."
By applying the stated findings to our instant case,
it is obvious that the broker had completed his work; had
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brought together a willing seller and a willing and able
buyer, but the seller had then breached the basic condition of the transaction.
The cases cited above confirm the broker's right
to judgment for his commission upon such state of affairs.
POINT IV
THAT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT FOR THE
SUM OF $4,400.00, BEING 5% OF THE AGREED VALUE OF
$88,000.00 FOR THE PROPERTIES THAT WERE TO BE EXCHANGED.

The preceding points clearly demonstrate that the
plaintiff as a licensed broker had earned his commission.
The amount of the commission was agreed to be 5% of
such sales price or exchange price as the seller "may agree
to accept." The exhibits in this case and the testimony
of the prospective buyer ( R. 65) establish the agreed
basis of sale and exchange at $88,000.00. The commission to which plaintiff is entitled is $4400.00 and judgment for such sum should be entered.

PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
721 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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